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Currency Crisis of Korea
Internal Weakness or
External Interdependence?
Dongchul Cho and Kiseok Hong
10.1 Introduction
During the 1997–98 period, the international capital market experi-
enced arguably the most severe turmoil since the Great Depression. Many
economists as well as international investors were greatly surprised by the
magnitude and abruptness of capital ﬂow reversals from the emerging
markets.
This surprise was possibly ampliﬁed by the fact that the crisis took place
in East Asia, which has long been regarded as a model economy; it exhib-
ited rapid growth combined with macrostability. To the economists and
policy makers who sought the causes of the remarkable achievements in
this region (e.g., World Bank 1993), the Asian Crisis came as a shock.
Even to those who were skeptical about the Asian Miracle, the abrupt
collapse of the region may not be a natural implication of their skepticism.
The main implication of input-driven growth (e.g., Krugman 1994 and
Young 1995) is the erosion of eﬃciency, and thus the natural prediction
would be a long-term slowdown of growth instead of an immediate col-
lapse. For this reason, many have been led to pay more attention to the
eﬀects of contagion (e.g., Agenor and Aizenman 1997 and Perry and Led-
erman 1998).
This paper examines the currency crisis of Korea—a key country in the
Asian Crisis as well as the Asian Miracle—in the context of this upheaval
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337in the international capital market. In particular, this paper attempts to
provide some clues to the question of whether Korea was a poor victim of
or a major contributor to the crisis in the global capital market. As is
expected from this sort of formidable question, the answer will be indef-
inite.
Nevertheless, this paper tries to distinguish quantitatively the eﬀects of
weaknesses in domestic fundamentals from the eﬀects of external interde-
pendence (called contagion eﬀects in this paper). We found that the magni-
tudes of contagion eﬀects were huge, but the Korean crisis could not be
completely attributable to these eﬀects alone. Weak domestic fundamen-
tals and poor management of the government appeared to play signiﬁcant
roles as well, particularly at the triggering moment of the crisis.
More speciﬁcally, the following three conclusions summarize this pa-
per’s analyses. First, the outbreak of the Korean crisis may not be com-
pletely attributable to the contagion eﬀects alone, although the crises of
other countries substantially worsened the situation. Second, Korea’s fun-
damentals prior to the crisis were not so strong that economists were as-
tonished with the outbreak of the crisis of Korea, although they were not
so weak that investors should have been able to anticipate the crisis. Third,
if one considered the structural vulnerability of Korea’s ﬁnancial market
in addition to the conventional macrofundamentals, and if one could have
foreseen the stubborn policies of the government in coping with ﬁnancial
turmoil, the Korean crisis might have been easier to anticipate.
This paper is organized as follows. Employing the conventional probit
model methodology for data from approximately 100 developing countries,
section 10.2 evaluates the position of Korea’s fundamentals, which are usu-
ally considered important in explaining currency crises in developing coun-
tries. Among those fundamental factors, Korea’s domestic macroeconomic
fundamentals were strong (high growth, low inﬂation, and mild current
account deﬁcits), whereas its external ﬁnance structure was fragile (low
reserve to short-term debt ratios and low FDI to GDP ratios). Overall,
Korea’s fundamentals were not particularly strong, but not particularly
weak either. It is true that Korea’s fundamentals sharply deteriorated in
1996 (thus raising the probability of a crisis in 1997) compared to the
1994–95 period, but the overall condition in 1996 was not terrible relative
to its historical average, except for the contagion eﬀects. In this section,
we also examine the eﬀect of neighbor countries (or contagion eﬀect) using
our own index of geographical proximity as well as the trade linkage index
developed by Glick and Rose (1998). An important ﬁnding is that our
geographical proximity index dominates the trade linkage index, which
may suggest that investors’ perceptions and expectations really matter in
transmitting currency crises.
Section 10.3 takes a further look at the contagion issue, using daily-
frequency data of the exchange rates and sovereign spreads on the U.S.
338 Dongchul Cho and Kiseok Hongdollar–denominated debts for selected countries. We use standard time-
series methodologies, and similar analyses can be found in Baig and Gold-
fajn (1998). Unlike Baig and Goldfajn, however, we extend the sample to
non-Asian countries such as Latin American countries, Russia, China,
and Japan, while focusing on the case of Korea. By doing so, we are able
to provide a more complete picture and to decompose explicitly the contri-
bution of the contagion eﬀects from other parts of the world. We also
relate the chronology of daily news on Korea’s ﬁnancial market to the
shocks identiﬁed by the time series analyses giving us a sense of the sort of
news which would negatively impact the ﬁnancial market at the triggering
moment of the crisis. Overall, we found that the news about the series of
chaebol bankruptcies and the government’s continued bailout policies for
these chaebols and ﬁnancial institutions appeared to operate negatively in
preventing foreign investors from ﬂeeing.
Section 10.4 notes some additional weaknesses in Korea’s ﬁnancial mar-
ket structure that deserve mention. In this section, we do not provide a
formal analysis to the degree we did in sections 10.2 and 10.3. Instead, we
brieﬂy summarize several points made by other researchers in Korea, so
that readers do not miss important aspects of the Korean crisis simply
because the eﬀects of those aspects cannot be easily quantiﬁed. In particu-
lar, we note the facts that the corporate sector of Korea had long suﬀered
from low proﬁtability and high leverage ratios, whereas a small number of
chaebols had extraordinarily high inﬂuence in the ﬁnancial system. Section
10.5 oﬀers some concluding remarks.
10.2 Domestic Fundamentals versus Contagion: Cross-Country Analysis
In this section we examine Korea’s economic fundamentals during the
precrisis period in comparison with other developing countries as well as
the role of the contagion eﬀect in the outbreak of Korea’s currency crisis.
To this end, we employ a probit model using a data set of roughly 100
developing countries.
10.2.1 Theory
Existing theories on currency crises are often classiﬁed into two genera-
tions of models.1 Whereas the ﬁrst-generation model stresses economic
fundamentals such as domestic credit expansion and liquidity (Krugman
1979), the second-generation model puts more emphasis on investors’
expectations and inherent instability in the international capital market
(Obstfeld 1995). In empirical investigations of a currency crisis, however,
it is hard to distinguish between the two classes of models. Although the
second-generation model emphasizes the role of expectations, expectations
1. See Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1995) for a detailed survey on the literature.
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practice, both classes of models commonly predict that the probability of
a currency crisis increases with deterioration of economic fundamentals.
The only way to distinguish between the two classes of models is to prove
that some crisis episodes are actually generated by self-fulﬁlling expecta-
tions. Clearly, this is a diﬃcult task. Referring to this diﬃculty, Garber
(1996) has concluded that the two classes of models are observationally
equivalent.
Similar argument applies to the so-called contagion eﬀect. Contagion
eﬀect refers to the phenomenon that a currency crisis spreads contagiously
from one country to another, for whatever reasons.2 Because contagion can
take place due either to cross-country correlation in economic fundamen-
tals or to pure investor psychology, the existence of contagion itself cannot
be used as evidence for self-fulﬁlling expectations. For more concrete evi-
dence, one needs to prove the existence of contagion after controlling for
all relevant economic fundamentals. In practice, however, it is not feasible
to control for every relevant variable.3
For this reason, this section does not intend to test the relevance of a
particular model. The goal of this section is simply to estimate a probit
equation that relates crisis episodes to standard macroeconomic funda-
mentals along with contagion measures, and to evaluate how well Korea’s
currency crisis episode ﬁts in the model.
10.2.2 Dependent Variable
The dependent variable for our probit estimation is a crisis index, which
has a value of 1 if a currency crisis occurs and 0 otherwise. Speciﬁcally,
following Frankel and Rose (1996), we deﬁne a currency crisis as a depre-
ciation of the nominal exchange rate (with respect to the U.S. dollar) of
at least 25 percent that is also at least a 10 percent increase in the rate
of depreciation.4
2. For discussion on various channels of contagion eﬀects, see Calvo and Reinhart (1996)
and Valdes (1996).
3. Nevertheless, there exists pioneering research that attempts to identify fundamental
channels of contagion eﬀects. For example, see Doukas (1999) for the channel through co-
movements of major macrovariables; Glick and Rose (1998) for the channel through trade;
and Frankel and Schmukler (1998) for the channel through the New York investor fund
community. For more microdata analyses that particularly stress the role of incomplete infor-
mation, see Aharony and Swary (1983, 1996); Park (1991); Karaﬁath, Mynatt, and Smith
(1991); Calomiris and Mason (1994).
4. Ideally, deﬁnition of a currency crisis should be comprehensive enough to incorporate
various events fully, such as violent depreciation of the exchange rate, sharp reduction in
foreign exchange reserves, and rapid increase in interest rates. For developing countries, how-
ever, it is hard to ﬁnd an interest rate measure that is consistent across countries and free
from direct government control. Also, developing countries with weak fundamentals tend
eventually to develop a currency crisis regardless of their eﬀorts to defend their currencies
using foreign exchange reserves. Thus, we use only the nominal exchange rate in constructing
our crisis index.
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For possible causes of a currency crisis, we consider the following three
sets of variables:
1. Macroeconomic indicators: GDP growth rate, real domestic credit
growth, inﬂation rate, ﬁscal deﬁcit/GDP ratio.
2. External variables: current account/GDP ratio, changes in the terms
of trade, changes in the real exchange rate, foreign reserves/short-term debt
ratio, FDI/GDP ratio, total foreign debt/GDP ratio, short-term debt/total
foreign debt ratio.
3. Foreign conditions: GDP growth rate and interest rate in developed
countries, crisis incidents of foreign countries.
A decrease in the GDP growth rate increases the possibility of a crisis
by weakening general solvency of the country or by engendering expan-
sionary monetary policy. Also, rapid expansion of domestic credit or ﬁs-
cal deﬁcit increases the possibility of a crisis by generating inﬂationary
pressures in the goods market and depreciation pressures in the foreign
exchange market. Factors such as deterioration in the terms of trade,
appreciation of the real exchange rate, and current account deﬁcits can
produce a crisis by reducing both proﬁtability of the exporting sector and
net foreign assets of the economy. Lastly, whereas a high foreign debt/GDP
ratio increases the probability of a crisis by making the country vulnerable
to a negative shock, high foreign reserves/short-term debt or FDI/GDP
ratios reduce the probability of a crisis by providing greater liquidity.
In addition to domestic fundamentals, foreign conditions can also play
a key role in the outbreak of a currency crisis. Because developed countries
are the net creditors in the international capital market, economic booms
in developed countries can lead to reductions in capital supply for devel-
oping countries. Among developing countries, a currency crisis in one
country may increase the possibility of crisis in another country. As was
mentioned earlier, this contagion eﬀect may reﬂect either cross-country
correlation in economic fundamentals or merely investors’ psychology. In
this section, we simply deﬁne the contagion index for each country as a
weighted average of the crisis index of all other countries, with the weights
given by either the inverse of geographical distance between the country
in question and other countries or the trade linkage used in Glick and Rose
(1998).5 Because currency crises appear to be regionally concentrated, we
suspect that geographical distance is perhaps the most important deter-
minant of the contagion eﬀect. Glick and Rose, on the other hand, argue
5. Because distributions of thus-constructed indexes are close to lognormal, we prevent
inﬂuence of potential outliers by taking logarithms of the indexes. Main results remain un-
aﬀected by the use of the original indexes.
Currency Crisis of Korea 341that contagion takes place mainly through trade channels. This section
considers both our own contagion index and the trade contagion index.6
Detailed deﬁnitions of explanatory variables are provided in the appendix.
10.2.4 Data
Our data set covers 103 developing countries, including the Asian and
Latin American countries hit by the crisis, mostly for the years 1980–96.
The nominal exchange rate, however, covers the period 1980–97. As we
will show, this enables us to relate the dependent variable to one-year-
lagged values of explanatory variables. Using lags of explanatory variables
better serves our goal of identifying the “causes” of a currency crisis. Un-
like other explanatory variables, however, we let the contagion index take
contemporaneous values with the dependent variable, because the conta-
gion eﬀect is expected to be coincident with currency crises. According to
our deﬁnition of currency crisis, about 10 percent of the total country-
years are classiﬁed as crisis episodes.
10.2.5 Probit Estimation Results
Probit estimation results using the aforementioned variables are re-
ported in table 10.1. Because coeﬃcients from probit estimation are hard
to interpret, we calculate the marginal contribution of each regressor to
the probability of a crisis, using historical means of the variables. We ﬁrst
report in columns 1 and 2 of the table the estimation results without the
contagion eﬀect. For most variables, the estimated coeﬃcients are signiﬁ-
cant and of the correct signs. This suggests that incidence of a currency
crisis is not randomly distributed across countries but is systematically
related to economic fundamentals. Variables such as government deﬁcit,
current account, and total foreign debt, however, are insigniﬁcant or of the
wrong signs. Frankel and Rose (1996) have reported similar ﬁndings. As
column 2 shows, when these insigniﬁcant variables are excluded from the
regression, coeﬃcients on the remaining regressors change only slightly.
In columns 3 and 4, we add a contagion index to the equation. We ﬁnd
that the trade contagion index and our contagion index each have signiﬁ-
cantly positive eﬀects.7 As was mentioned earlier, however, it is not clear
what the correlation between the crisis index and the contagion index truly
implies. Although we have included standard macroeconomic variables in
6. One may argue that contagion of crises may take place through ﬁnancial linkages as
well (see, for example, Kaminsky and Reinhart 2000). In a separate paper, Hong (2000) has
constructed a ﬁnancial contagion index using the BIS data on international claims, and com-
pared it with the regional and trade contagion indexes of this paper. Hong has found that
the main result of this section still holds: The regional contagion index dominates the trade
and ﬁnancial contagion indexes.
7. According to the estimates, a one-unit increase in the trade contagion index and our
contagion index (100 percent increase in the original contagion indexes) increases the proba-
bility of a currency crisis by 4 and 6 percentage points, respectively.





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.the regression, the possibility of important excluded variables still remains.
In addition, using one index without the other may produce biased esti-
mates because the two indexes are likely to be correlated.8 Only by consid-
ering both indexes at the same time, will one be able to properly evaluate
the independent contribution of each index to the probability of a cur-
rency crisis.
We report the results from this experiment in column 5 of table 10.1.
Note that when the two indexes are included in one regression, our index
dominates the trade contagion index and the latter becomes insigniﬁcant.
This result suggests that the trade contagion index works only as a proxy
for our contagion index, and thus the trade linkage is probably not the
main channel of regional contagion of crises.9 For this reason, we will use
column 3 as our benchmark estimates for the rest of this section. Under
the benchmark estimates, the average of the ﬁtted probability for all actual
crisis episodes is 0.18.
10.2.6 Korea’s Currency Crisis and Contagion
In this section, we focus on Korea’s currency crisis based on results from
previous sections. First, we report the ﬁtted values for Korea and other
countries hit by crisis, such as Mexico, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indone-
sia. As column 1 of table 10.2 shows, when only economic fundamentals
in 1996 are considered, the ﬁtted value was 0.127 for Korea and below 0.1
for the other Asian countries. Considering the fact that the unconditional
probability of a currency crisis is 0.1 in our sample, the Asian crisis as a
whole was rather unanticipated. The only exception is Korea, whose eco-
nomic fundamentals in 1996 appear to have been weak enough to imply a
possible crisis in the following year.10 The ﬁnding that the crisis probability
of Korea in 1996 was relatively high may be surprising, because many
people haveargued thatKorea’s economicfundamentals weresound before
the crisis. Column 1 of table 10.2 does not support this popular claim.11
The crisis potential of Asia in 1997 was small, not only by international
standards, but also by its own historical trends. As shown in column 2 of
table 10.2, the ﬁtted probability for the Asian countries was not substan-
tially greater in 1997 than it was in the earlier years. For example, Korea’s
8. It is obvious that trade is more active among countries in geographical proximity. In
fact, correlation of the two indexes in our pooled data set is 0.7.
9. One problem is that due to data availability, we used only the 1997 international trade
matrix, assuming that the trade linkage is constant over time. For more rigorous results, we
need to construct the trade linkage for every year. However when the sample period is re-
stricted to 1992–97, however, our index still dominates the trade linkage.
10. Rigorously speaking, the estimated probability is not ex ante, because the contagion
index takes contemporaneous values. For countries like Korea where a crisis took place at
the end of the year, however, the probability may well be considered as ex ante.
11. Table 10.3 (heading C) is not a true out-of-sample exercise, because observations in
1997 are used in the estimation. An out-of-sample exercise, however, changes the results
only slightly.
344 Dongchul Cho and Kiseok Hongcrisis potential was about 0.1 even before 1996. Although we ﬁnd that the
Korean economy in 1996 was in fact much weaker than it was during
the economic boom of 1994 and 1995, 1996 was not the worst year of
the decade.
In columns 3–6 of table 10.2, we examine whether the crisis probability
increases for Asian countries when the contagion eﬀect is included as an
additional regressor. Depending upon which contagion index is used the
results vary substantially. When the trade linkage index is used, the esti-
mated probabilities of the Asian countries change only slightly. However,
our geographical linkage index substantially increases the estimated prob-
ability for the Asian countries from the range of 0.08–0.13 to the average
level of ex post crisis countries, 0.19! According to this result, one could
naturally have predicted the Korean crisis after the outbreak of the South-
east Asian turmoil.
Next, we examine which variables were particularly important in Ko-
rea’s currency crisis compared with other crisis episodes. To this end, we
calculate the contribution of each explanatory variable to the incidence of
each crisis by multiplying the benchmark coeﬃcient estimates in column
4 of table 10.1 with the corresponding values of explanatory variables.
Deviation of each crisis from a reference-group mean of similarly con-
structed contribution measures can be used to illustrate distinguishing fea-
tures of each crisis episode. Before examining each individual country’s
episode in detail, however, we ﬁrst compare the average values of the crisis
Table 10.2 Cross-Country Probit Analyses: Probability of a Currency Crisis
With Contagion With Contagion With Contagion
Index (from eq. Index (from eq. Index (from eq.
[2] in table 10.1) [3] in table 10.1) [4] in table 10.1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mexico
(1987–93) 0.133 0.100 0.140
(1994) 0.132 0.115 0.168
Thailand
(1987–96) 0.088 0.093 0.082
(1997) 0.084 0.106 0.182
Malaysia
(1987–96) 0.041 0.043 0.040
(1997) 0.081 0.075 0.138
Indonesia
(1987–96) 0.111 0.114 0.102
(1997) 0.070 0.101 0.171
Korea
(1987–96) 0.112 0.100 0.102
(1997) 0.127 0.148 0.208
Currency Crisis of Korea 345countries with those of the whole sample in table 10.3. This table clearly
shows that, on average, the crisis countries exhibit weaknesses in all of
the considered fundamentals. Apart from the contagion, in particular, the
reserves to short-term debt ratio makes the greatest contribution to the
crisis probability.
Table 10.3 also reports the results from the same experiment for each
individual country’s episode, using all crisis countries (column 1) as our
reference group to be compared. A negative number in the table implies
that the contribution of the variable to the corresponding crisis episode is
smaller than to the whole crisis group in our data set. In Korea’s crisis, for
example, external factors (such as the terms-of-trade shock, low reserves,
and low FDI) have been particularly important, whereas domestic macro-
Table 10.3 Cross-Country Probit Analyses: Contribution of Each Explanatory
Variable to the Asian Crisis





Per capita GDP growth 0.00477 0.01056 0.00314
Inﬂation 0.18787 0.30629 0.00429
Real domestic credit growth 0.01930 0.03707 0.00113
Terms of trade changes 0.00804 0.03552 0.00337
Real exchange rate
depreciation 0.01699 0.05357 0.00715
Reserves/short-term debt 3.39132 1.27950 0.01752
FDI/GDP 1.25291 0.71543 0.00600
Our contagion index 2.39022 2.10817 0.01946
Sum of deviations 0.06206
Deviations from Average Values of Crisis Countries
Mexico Thailand Malaysia Indonesia Korea
(1994) (1997) (1997) (1997) (1997)
Per capita GDP growth 0.00106 0.00987 0.01049 0.01150 0.01154
Inﬂation 0.00772 0.00904 0.00985 0.00831 0.00935
Real domestic credit growth 0.00046 0.01887 0.00525 0.00575 0.00561
Terms of trade changes 0.00398 0.00484 0.00710 0.00879 0.00549
Real exchange rate
depreciation 0.00641 0.00275 0.00466 0.00346 0.00930
Reserves/short-term debt 0.00492 0.00241 0.00898 0.00602 0.00609
FDI/GDP 0.00416 0.00610 0.04260 0.03133 0.00263
Our contagion index 0.00724 0.05687 0.05392 0.04985 0.03376
Sum of deviations 0.00118 0.00781 0.02452 0.00176 0.02339
aMarginal Contribution to Crisis Probability  x[(b)  (a)].
346 Dongchul Cho and Kiseok Hongconditions (such as GDP growth and inﬂation) had limited eﬀects. Also,
in most Asian countries the growth rate of real domestic credit has had a
positive impact, supporting the popular view that overlending and overin-
vestment were critical factors in the Asian crisis.
Table 10.3 also indicates that the role of the contagion eﬀect has been
more important in the Asian crisis than in other crisis episodes. Even for
Korea, which was the least aﬀected by contagion of the Asian countries,
the contagion eﬀect appears to have played a key role. Figure 10.1 plots
the contagion index of Korea along with the world average of the index.
We have so far examined Korea’s currency crisis on the basis of a gen-
eral probit model. In short, the results suggest that the role of the conta-
gion eﬀect in Korea’s crisis was signiﬁcant, but economic fundamentals of
Korea (particularly external factors) were not sound prior to the crisis,
relative to the other Asian countries in particular. Although the above
exercises produce many interesting results, one should acknowledge many
limitations as well. Perhaps the most important limitation is that our exer-
cise was performed for virtually a single observation out of more than
2,000 sample points, and thus the related error margin is potentially very
large.
10.3 Country Shock versus Contagion: Further Analysis with Daily Data
The previous section of cross-country analyses suggests that the conta-
gion eﬀect may have been a major cause of the Korean crisis as well as
the Asian crises in general. However, the cross-country analyses cannot
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Fig. 10.1 Distance contagion index of Korea (1980–97)examine dynamic diﬀusion processes of shocks across countries. With re-
spect to the analysis of contagion eﬀects, this seems to be an important
limitation. For example, when many countries fall into crises in the same
year, it is impossible to investigate whether one country’s crisis causes
another or whether they altogether generate a vicious circle of crises
through mutual interactions. With the binary deﬁnition of the crisis, it
becomes even harder to examine to what extent the crises of other coun-
tries worsened the situation of one country. In addition, it seems persua-
sive to argue that shocks in ﬁnancial markets are transmitted so rapidly
that analyses with annual data can hardly capture the complete picture.
In this section, therefore, we analyze the high-frequency data of the rele-
vant variables, namely, daily data of the exchange rates (against the U.S.
dollar) and the spreads (over the Treasury bill rate) of the U.S. dollar–
denominated sovereign debts. When high-frequency data are used, the lim-
itation of data coverage across countries as well as the relevant macro-
variables that can help identify the sources of contagion are obvious
disadvantages. For this reason, we will not seriously question the ultimate
sources of the contagion eﬀects in this section. Instead, we will attribute
the whole magnitude “explained” by the shocks of other countries in the
regressions to contagion eﬀects, and the remaining parts to eﬀects from
domestic shocks.12
Considering data availability and its importance in the recent crisis, we
selected ten countries: Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Russia, China, Korea,
Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and Japan. Japan is included in order to
check whether we can ﬁnd any systematic evidence for the popular argu-
ment that the weakness of the Japanese economy played a signiﬁcant role
in triggering the Asian crisis. The sample period was chosen from 19 June
1997 to 31 December 1998, so that we can cover the situation right before
Thailand’s crisis. The sample size is approximately 400 for each country.
The recent paper by Baig and Goldfajn (1998) presents similar analyses
to those in this section, but we examine data largely from Korea’s view-
point using a wider set of countries. Details of the data sources can be
found in the appendix.
10.3.1 Exchange Rates
A serious diﬃculty with using the exchange rate data is that the govern-
ment, implicitly or explicitly, controls this variable in many countries. For
example, the exchange rates of the three Latin American countries, Russia,
and China are virtually uncorrelated with the exchange rates of other coun-
tries (not reported) because the governments of these countries managed
their exchange rates. We dropped these ﬁve countries from our sample
12. Put more precisely, domestic shock is deﬁned as the component that is orthogonal to
shocks to other countries in the sample. Therefore, it is likely that more variations are attrib-
uted to domestic shocks when a smaller number of countries are included in the sample.
348 Dongchul Cho and Kiseok Hongfor this reason and analyzed the ﬁve Asian countries, even though it is
known that the governments in these countries also intervened in the for-
eign exchange markets from time to time. A more accurate reading of the
pure market responses probably can be found from the sovereign spread
data in secondary markets, the results for which we will discuss in the
next section.
Cross-Country Correlation
Having conﬁrmed that the null hypotheses of unit roots in the log of the
exchange rates are not rejected (see heading A of table 10.4), heading B of
table 10.4 reports the pair-wise correlation coeﬃcients of the log diﬀer-
ences for the ﬁve Asian countries. This table shows that the daily ﬂuctua-
tions are closely correlated with one another.13 However, the correlation
coeﬃcients of Korea with other countries are far smaller than those among
13. All of the exchange rates are against the U.S. dollar, and correlation across countries
may be spurious in that it may reﬂect the common ﬂuctuation of the U.S. dollar. In this
sense, an interpretation about the absolute degree of the correlation coeﬃcient should be
made with caution. However, comparison of the coeﬃcient with other countries is largely
immune to this problem.
Table 10.4 Analyses for the Exchange Rate
Korea Malaysia Thailand Indonesia Japan
A. ADF Test for Unit Root (daily data, lag  2, including intercept)a
Test statistic 2.24 2.31 2.62 1.71 1.52
B. Pair-wise Correlation Coeﬃcients (daily data, log-diﬀerence)b
Korea 1.00
Malaysia 0.10 1.00
Thailand 0.09 0.41 1.00
Indonesia 0.22 0.49 0.27 1.00
Japan 0.08 0.12 0.20 0.11 1.00
C. Pair-wise Correlation Coeﬃcients (daily data, log-level)b
Korea 1.00
Malaysia 0.81 1.00
Thailand 0.82 0.82 1.00
Indonesia 0.67 0.83 0.56 1.00
Japan 0.51 0.68 0.56 0.77 1.00
D. p-Value for the Granger Causality Test (daily data, log-diﬀerence)c
Korea 0.07 0.40 0.25 0.13
Malaysia 0.01 0.00 0.48 0.01
Thailand 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.77
Indonesia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.16
Japan 0.82 0.26 0.65 0.87
a1% critical value 3.45, 5% critical value 2.87, 10% critical value 2.57.
bAsymptotic standard error 0.05.
cNumbers are p-values of the tests for the nulls of no Granger causality from the country in
the column to the country in the row.
Currency Crisis of Korea 349the three Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries.
This result may be regarded as consistent with the ﬁnding from the cross-
country data that the contagion eﬀect was small for Korea relative to the
ASEAN countries.
In addition, Japan’s exchange rate does not appear to be signiﬁcantly
correlated with that of Korea; it is more correlated with the exchange rates
of the ASEAN countries. At least from the daily variations for the sample
period used in this paper, it appears diﬃcult to justify the casual argument
that the weakness of the Japanese yen was a major cause of the Asian
crisis, particularly the crisis of Korea.
The relatively low frequency data or the level data shows a slightly
diﬀerent picture. For example, the correlation coeﬃcients of Korea with
the other countries are signiﬁcant for the ﬁrst diﬀerences of the weekly
averages (not reported) and for the levels under heading C of table 10.4,
although the degrees are still smaller than other coeﬃcients. This may in-
dicate that sizable lagged eﬀects exist in transmitting one country’s shock
to another country, and if so, the Granger causality test exercise can be
meaningful.
Granger Causality Test
Heading D of table 10.4 reports the p-values of the test statistic under
the null of no Granger causality for each pair of countries, using two
days of time lags. It may not be surprising that shocks in many countries
Granger-cause movements in many other countries. What is impressive,
however, is that Korea Granger-caused devaluations of the ASEAN coun-
tries far more signiﬁcantly than vice versa. In addition, it is hard to ﬁnd
any causality connections between Japan and Korea, which is consistent
with the result from the contemporaneous correlation coeﬃcients.
VAR Simulation
How much of Korea’s devaluation can be attributed to the contagion,
and how much to the country’s own shock? In order to provide a mechani-
cal answer to this question, we applied the vector autoregression (VAR)
technique for these ﬁve countries’ data, using two lagged variables and no
drift terms.14 As for the ordering of the countries, we used the Granger
causality results of table 10.4: Korea → Malaysia → Thailand → Indone-
sia → Japan. Because the VAR results are usually sensitive to the order-
ings, however, we tried the other extreme case for Korea: Malaysia →
Thailand → Indonesia → Japan → Korea. Figure 10.1 plots the actual
exchange rate of Korea, along with the two simulated paths by the respec-
14. Experiments with more than two lagged variables did not greatly change the simulation
results, and the null of no drift term was accepted for all of the regressions.
350 Dongchul Cho and Kiseok Hongtive VAR estimations that would have been realized if the shocks to other
countries had not occurred. That is, the two dotted lines depict the ex-
change rate variations that can be attributed to the domestic shocks of
Korea and its repercussions through the other four countries in the VAR
models.
From these experiments, one can see that the contagion eﬀects on Ko-
rea’s exchange rate were large throughout the whole sample period, which
is consistent with the results from the cross-country analyses. According
to the lower dotted line that attributes Korea’s variation wholly to the
contagion eﬀects, the exchange rate would have returned to the precrisis
level during the second half of 1999 if there had been no foreign shocks.
Also, the decomposition of the variation between domestic shocks and
foreign shocks is rather insensitive to the ordering of the equations; that
is, the two dotted lines are close to each other. This robustness of the re-
sults for Korea may have been expected from the above results for the cor-
relation coeﬃcients and the Granger causality tests.
Perhaps a more important message of ﬁgure 10.2 is, however, that the
domestic shock must have played a critical role at least in triggering the
explosion during the period of November and December 1998. Of course,
this experiment has many limitations. As was noted earlier, for example,
the exchange rate data are contaminated by the government intervention,
and thus the analysis of the contagion eﬀects was performed for only a
limited number of countries. In particular, the redevaluation of the Asian
exchange rates in the second half of 1998 was often attributed to the crises
of Russia and Brazil, but the above analysis could not give support to
this conjecture. In section 10.3.2, therefore, we present the results for the
sovereign spread data in the secondary market for a wider set of countries.
10.3.2 Sovereign Spreads
The general methodology employed here is virtually identical to that in
the previous section except for the coverage of the sample countries: For
the sovereign spread data, we can include three Latin American countries
(Brazil, Argentina, Mexico), Russia, and China, in addition to the previ-
ous Asian ﬁve. Parallel to the previous section, we focus on the results for
the ﬁrst diﬀerences. This is diﬀerent from Baig and Goldfajn (1998), whose
study analyzed the results for the levels of the sovereign spreads. It is not
clear to us which one of the two is a superior concept in the context of
contagion eﬀects. Our choice of the ﬁrst diﬀerence is based on the test
results that do not reject the nulls of the unit roots in the data (see heading
A of table 10.5). However, we also report some of the results for the level
data as well because the correlation of the ﬁrst diﬀerences only shows the
contemporaneous daily contagion, whereas the correlation of the levels
may indicate that the contagion cumulated over time with time lags.


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Heading B of table 10.5 reports the pair-wise correlation coeﬃcients of
the ﬁrst diﬀerences of the sovereign spreads for the ten countries. First,
the correlation coeﬃcients among the three Latin American countries are
extremely high: They are over 0.7! One may be able to argue that the three
countries are taken to be virtually a single market in the international capi-
tal market.
In contrast, the correlation coeﬃcients among the three ASEAN coun-
tries are far smaller: The correlation coeﬃcient between Malaysia and
Thailand is barely signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level, whereas the coeﬃcients
between Indonesia and the other two countries are not signiﬁcant at all.
In fact, Indonesia appears to be more correlated with Latin American
countries than with other Asian countries. Russia is also more correlated
with Latin American countries than with the Asian countries, and China
is not signiﬁcantly correlated with any other countries. It is interesting that
Japan shows negative correlation with Latin American countries, which
seems to indicate that the international capital market perceives the crises
in Latin America as positive shocks to Japan (or negative shocks to the
UnitedStates;recallthatweusethespreadsovertheU.S.Treasurybillrate).
Finally, it is surprising that Korea shows stronger correlation with the
Latin American countries than with Asian countries. As in the exchange
rate analyses, however, the cross-country correlation appears to be far
more signiﬁcant when the ﬁrst diﬀerences of the weekly average or the
levels of the daily data are used.15 For the ﬁrst diﬀerences of the weekly
average data (not reported) or for the levels under heading C in table 10.5,
for example, Korea turns out to be signiﬁcantly correlated with all other
countries except Indonesia. Again, this divergence of results when the data
frequency is varied seems to suggest that substantial time lags exist in the
contagion eﬀects that cannot be captured by the contemporaneous daily
correlation.
Granger Causality Test
This argument is conﬁrmed by the Granger causality test results re-
ported under heading D in table 10.5. Allowing for just two days of time
lags, the nulls of no causality were rejected in many pairs for which the
contemporaneous daily correlation did not appear to be signiﬁcant. For
example, Thailand appeared to be signiﬁcantly correlated only with Ma-
laysia in the daily diﬀerence correlation, but it appeared to Granger-cause,
as well as to be Granger-caused by, many other countries. The passive role
of Japan is conﬁrmed again: It was Granger-caused by most of the sample
15. For example, Valdes (1996) used the average of weekly data for the sovereign spreads
for Latin American countries.
Currency Crisis of Korea 355countries, but it did not Granger-cause the crisis countries. As in the previ-
ous section, the role of Japan in triggering the crises appeared to be min-
imal.
Finally, Korea was Granger-caused by the Latin American countries as
well as it Granger-caused them, but it Granger-caused the other Asian
countries and was not Granger-caused by them. All of these results are
not in accordance with the casual assertion that the ASEAN or Japanese
ﬁnancial crises triggered the Korean crisis. Instead, these results seem to
support the hypothesis that the Korean crisis was largely triggered by do-
mestic weaknesses and that it was deepened by the crises of Russia and
Brazil later on.
VAR Simulation
Using similar methodology as described in the previous section, ﬁgure
10.3 plots the actual sovereign spread of Korea, along with the simulated
paths by the VAR estimations (two lagged variables and no drift terms)
that would have been realized if the shocks to other countries had not
occurred.16 As for the ordering of the countries, again, we referred to the
Granger causality test results (Brazil → Argentina → Mexico → Russia →
China → Korea → Malaysia → Thailand → Indonesia → Japan). In order
to check the sensitivity of the result, we also report an additional simula-
tionresult that placed Korea at the bottom in the ordering of the countries.
A literal interpretation of this graph is that the spike in Korea’s spread
in mid-1998 would not have occurred if there had been no crises in other
countries (Brazil in particular): The simulated spread does not exceed 400
basis points, whereas the actual spread peaked at 1,000 basis points. This
is somewhat diﬀerent from the result for the exchange rate in ﬁgure 10.2
in which Russia and Latin American countries were not considered. That
is, this diﬀerence indicates that Korea’s crisis was signiﬁcantly aﬀected by
the contagion eﬀects from the Russian and Latin American crises in the
second half of 1998. Nevertheless, the rise of Korea’s spread in 1997 can-
not be fully attributed to contagion eﬀects, which is the same conclusion
as in the analyses with the exchange rates.
10.3.3 News
An important result from the analyses of both the exchange rates and
sovereign spreads is that the outbreak of the Korean crisis at the end of
1997 is hardly attributable to contagion eﬀects. In this section, therefore,
we examine more closely what happened inside Korea during this critical
period from October to December 1997. For this purpose, we collect ma-
jor news on the ﬁnancial market and examine how the market reacted to
each incident.
16. Experiments with more than two lagged variables did not greatly change the simulation
results, and the constant terms appeared to be insigniﬁcant for most countries.





















































































































































































































































































































































































.Figure 10.4 reports Korea’s residuals that were identiﬁed from the VAR
estimation of the exchange rate and sovereign spreads (with Korea at the
ﬁfth position from the bottom in the ordering). From this ﬁgure, one may
ﬁnd the four subperiods that experienced serious negative shocks (or the
positive residuals), which we highlighted with the shaded areas: 10/21–
10/25, 10/30–11/8, 12/8–12/13, and 12/22–12/24.
Table 10.6 reports the relevant news that we collected from several Ko-
rean newspapers (Maeil Economic Daily, Hankuk Economic Daily, and
so forth) and Bloomberg. In order to reduce possible selection bias, we
tried to collect only the headline news of the ﬁnancial sections in domestic
newspapers, and simply skipped the dates on which the headline news
were mere descriptions of the ﬁnancial market situation. From Bloomberg,
in contrast, we included the comments on Korea’s situations and govern-
ment policies.
One can notice that the news for the International Monetary Fund’s
(IMF) rescue plan was not a big shock to the market; it may have been
anticipated. Rather, the news that stirred the ﬁnancial market was the
bankruptcies of several chaebols and ﬁnancial institutions and the bailout
policies of the government. Readers can also refer to table 10.11 to see
how many conglomerates of Korea had gone bankrupt right before the
crisis and how large they were in the Korean ﬁnancial market. The ﬁrst
358 Dongchul Cho and Kiseok Hong
Fig. 10.4 Domestic shocks identiﬁed by the VAR, 1997


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.period matches the news about the bailout policy for Kia, whereas the
second period coincides with the bankruptcy news of Haitai and New-
Core. The third period matches the news on the acquisition of Ssangyong
Autos by Daewoo and the unconditional rescues of many distressed ﬁ-
nancial institutions, including two major bankrupt banks (First Korea and
Seoul) by the government (and the Bank of Korea). Finally, the last period
was driven by the news that Moody’s downgraded Korea’s sovereign debt
to a junk-bond level and the ﬁnance department vice minister’s acknowl-
edgment that Korea’s foreign debt may exceed $250 billion instead of the
oﬃcial $100 billion.
In short, the news that the Korean government still tried to stick to old-
fashioned bailout policies appears to have operated as bad shocks. At least
at the triggering moment of the Korean crisis, the market’s reaction ap-
peared to be most negative to the series of chaebol bankruptcies and the
government’s bailout policies.
10.4 Further Discussion on the Korean Crisis
The previous section suggests that the Korean crisis was triggered more
by domestic shocks than by contagion eﬀects, although the contagion
eﬀects substantially deepened the crisis. This is basically in accordance
with the result from the probit analyses, with more emphasis on domestic
weaknesses. Yet, the probit analyses indicate that the domestic fundamen-
tals were not extremely bad. This section, therefore, adds some discussion
about some important weaknesses of Korea’s ﬁnancial market structure
that we could not systematically analyze due to the limitations of compa-
rable cross-country data availability. Instead of providing formal analysis
results, we will brieﬂy sketch the crucial points that have been made by
other researchers.
10.4.1 Bank Runs rather than Currency Speculation
Table 10.7 shows Korea’s balance-of-payment situation during the
1997–98 period. From this table, one can be astonished at how abrupt the
capital ﬂow reversal was during the fourth quarter in 1997. The usable
foreign reserve, which had been ﬂuctuating around $30 billion until the
third quarter, abruptly decreased by $15 billion during just one month,
November 1997. In fact, the foreign reserve would have been completely
depleted by the end of December had there not been the emergency loan
of $16 billion through the public sector institutions, such as the IMF and
the World Bank.
An important point of this table, however, is that the major component
of this abrupt capital ﬂow reversal was the withdrawal of foreign debt
rather than the shift of portfolio investment. Private external debt de-
creased by $6.5 billion in November and by $11.3 billion in December,






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.whereas the magnitude of equity securities outﬂow was rather small. If
one includes the emergency loan of the Bank of Korea to the overseas
branches of the Korean banks that were on the brink of bankruptcies, the
decrease of private foreign debt in November was over $15 billion!
Based on this inspection, Shin (1998) argues that the triggering mecha-
nism of the currency crisis in Korea ﬁts the bank-run theories (e.g., Cole
and Kehoe 1996; Goldfajn and Valdes 1997; Chang and Velasco 1998)
better than the speculative attack hypotheses (e.g., Krugman 1979; and
Obstfeld 1995). Somewhat arbitrarily, table 10.8 decomposes the demand
for foreign reserves into two parts: the component that was not aﬀected
by the exchange rate movement from the creditor’s point of view, and the
other component that was subject to the capital loss from currency depre-
ciation. According to this decomposition, one can conﬁrm that the ﬁrst
component outweighs the second in magnitude. This ﬁnding seems to sup-
port the hypothesis that the abrupt reversal of the capital ﬂow in Korea
was triggered by the bankruptcy risks of the major Korean banks, rather
than the hypothesis that currency speculation in pursuit of capital gain
triggered massive capital outﬂow.
This argument appears to be reinforced by the external liability rollover
rate of the seven major Korean banks in table 10.9, cited from Shin (1998).
That is, the rollover rate of the major Korean banks, which already re-
mained below 100 percent before November, sharply declined in Novem-
ber and further in December.
In relation to the contagion issue and the contagious eﬀects from the
weak ﬁnancial system of Japan in particular, table 10.10 shows that Ja-
pan’s role was not particularly prominent. That is, the absolute amount of
credit withdrawn by Japan was large because of its high exposure to the
Korean market, but the ﬂight from Korean banks was a general phenome-
non regardless of the creditors’ region. This information is also consistent
with the result of the above section that Japan’s role appears to be minimal
in triggering the Korean crisis.
10.4.2 Fragile Financial Market Structure
That Was Not Considered Above
We argued that the Korean crisis appeared to be triggered by bank runs
rather than speculative currency attacks. We also argued that the critical
news triggering the crisis seemed to be the chaebol bankruptcies and the
bail out policies of the government. In relation to these arguments, this
section brieﬂy mentions the fragile aspects of Korea’s ﬁnancial system that
were not considered in the probit model analyses.
Perhaps the most important weaknesses in Korea’s ﬁnancial structure
that were overlooked in the probit analyses were the low proﬁtability and
the high leverage ratios of the corporate sector. Figure 10.5 shows that the
corporate sector of Korea had the lowest proﬁtability and the highest debt/
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Table 10.10 Trend of Regional Composition of Foreign Loans: Thirteen Major Banksa
96.12 97.3 97.6 97.9 97.12
Japan 259.7 (50.2) 212.8 (42.0) 220.9 (44.8) 206.3 (45.8) 139.5 (47.6)
United States 70.1 (13.5) 88.3 (17.4) 86.4 (17.5) 70.5 (15.7) 46.3 (15.8)
Europe 187.6 (36.3) 205.4 (40.6) 185.8 (37.7) 173.0 (38.5) 107.1 (36.6)
Totalb 517.4 (100.0) 506.4 (100.0) 493.1 (100.0) 449.8 (100.0) 292.9 (100.0)
aSeven commercial banks and six specialized banks.
bThis ﬁgure excludes foreign loans extended by creditor banks in regions other than Japan, the United
States, and Europe.
Table 10.9 Weekly Rollover Rate of Foreign Loans: Seven Major Commercial Banks, 1997
July August September October November December
First week 157.3 64.1 82.2 83.7 70.0 23.7
Second week 95.5 84.9 82.8 83.9 67.2 26.8
Third week 83.6 86.9 84.1 80.5 55.9 26.2
Fourth week 76.1 76.2 89.8 84.9 48.7 31.9
Fifth week 87.5 127.3 53.3
Average 89.1 79.2 85.5 86.5 58.8 32.2
Fig. 10.5 Debt equity ratio and EBIT-total assets for East Asian countries
(1991–96)
Source: Nam, Kang, and Kim (1999).
Note: The solid square denotes average for 1991–92; the solid circle denotes average for
1995–96.equity ratio among the eight Asian countries. This ﬁnancial structure was
a large potential threat to the solvency of the banking sector of Korea.
In addition, the high concentration of ﬁnancial assets in a small number
of chaebols was perceived to be another factor causing vulnerability in the
ﬁnancial system. Table 10.11 shows that the top thirty chaebols governed
almost 50 percent of the total assets in Korea. Under this high concentra-
tion ratio, a small negative shock to the chaebols could develop into sys-
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Table 10.11 Thirty Largest Chaebols: April 1996 (in trillions of won)
Leverage Number of Date of
Total Assets (debt/equity) Subsidiaries Bankruptcy
1. Hyundai 43.7 (6.94) 440% 46
2. Samsung 40.8 (6.48) 279% 55
3. LG 31.4 (4.99) 345% 48
4. Daewoo 31.3 (4.97) 391% 25
5. SK 14.6 (2.32) 352% 32
6. Ssangyong 13.9 (2.21) 310% 23
7. Hanjin 12.2 (1.94) 559% 24
8. Kia 11.4 (1.81) 522% 16 07/16/97*
9. Hanhwa 9.2 (1.46) 712% 31 12/17/97***
10. Lotte 7.1 (1.13) 191% 28
11. Kumho 6.4 (1.02) 480% 27
12. Doosan 5.8 (0.92) 907% 26
13. Daelim 5.4 (0.86) 424% 18
14. Hanbo 5.1 (0.81) 648% 21 01/18/97*
15. Dongah 5.1 (0.81) 362% 16 01/10/98***
16. Halla 4.8 (0.76) 2,457% 17 12/03/97***
17. Hyosung 3.6 (0.57) 362% 16
18. Dongkuk 3.4 (0.54) 223% 16
19. Jinro 3.3 (0.52) 4,836% 14 09/09/97**
20. Kolon 3.1 (0.49) 340% 19
21. Tongyang 3.0 (0.48) 305% 22
22. Hansol 3.0 (0.48) 291% 19
23. Dongbu 2.9 (0.46) 219% 24
24. Kohap 2.9 (0.46) 603% 11 01/30/98***
25. Haitai 2.9 (0.46) 669% 14 08/26/97*
26. Sammi 2.5 (0.40) 3,333% 8 03/20/97*
27. Hanil 2.2 (0.35) 581% 8 12/31/97***
28. Keukdong 2.2 (0.35) 516% 11
29. Newcore 2.0 (0.32) 1,253% 18 05/23/97**
30. Byucksan 1.9 (0.30) 473% 16
Total 286.9 (45.6) 669
Source: Data from the Fair Trade Commission.
Note: Figures in parentheses are the share of total assets in percentages of the corporate
sector in Korea (629.8 trillion won as of the end of 1996).
*denotes bankruptcy.
**denotes standstill agreement.
***denotes syndicated loan.temic risk aﬀecting the whole banking sector. In this regard, the severe
deterioration in the proﬁtability of the top six to seventy chaebols since
1995 as shown in ﬁgure 10.6 was a growing threat to the whole banking
system of Korea. In table 10.11 we also report the bankruptcy dates to
show how many chaebols went bankrupt during 1997. Recognizing this
aspect of Korea’s ﬁnancial system may help readers better understand why
the ﬁnancial market reacted so drastically to the news of chaebol bank-
ruptcies.
10.5 Concluding Remarks
This paper examines the Korean currency crisis, focusing on the weak-
nesses in domestic fundamentals as opposed to the contagious external
eﬀects. The results of this paper appear to suggest that the contagion
eﬀects were large, but not suﬃcient enough to explain Korea’s crisis. In
particular, the triggering moment of the crisis did not appear to be attrib-
utable to the contagion eﬀects.
As for the conventional factors that are considered important in ex-
plaining the currency crisis, Korea’s fundamentals were weak, but not
extreme enough to generate such a deep crisis. While external transac-
tions were loosely managed, domestic macrofundamentals appeared to be
368 Dongchul Cho and Kiseok Hong
Fig. 10.6 Interest payment coverage ratios for listed ﬁrms
Source: National Information and Credit Evaluation, Inc.
Notes: Figures for 1998 are those for the ﬁrst half of 1998. (A) includes all subsidiaries of
the top 6–70 chaebols; (B) excludes Kia and Asia automobile companies among the top
6–70 chaebols.sound. Nevertheless, the Korean currency crisis seems to have been trig-
gered by runs on the major banks, with the triggering moment associated
with the bankruptcies of chaebols and the nontransparent bailout policies
of the government. This observation seems to suggest that additional frag-
ile aspects of the ﬁnancial system were important in explaining Korea’s
crisis. Examples of such aspects are the low proﬁtability and high leverage
ratio of the corporate sector, the high concentration ratio of ﬁnancial assets
in a small number of chaebols, and so forth.
A crucial question that arises here is why the bank runs were triggered
by foreign investors while domestic investors were less worried. A possible
explanation is the divergence of expectations about conventional practices
of the government policies. That is, among Korean investors, expectations
about bailout policies for chaebol and ﬁnancial institutions were largely
expected while foreign investors were surprised. If this proposition is true,
Korea’s crisis was a more fundamental crisis for the whole ﬁnancial system
of Korea rather than a simple liquidity crisis for foreign exchanges. In
other words, the crisis may have been an inevitable outcome when the
implicit bailout expectation among Korean investors (or the crony capital-
ism of Krugman 1998) was broken by foreign investors. This is a complex




Most of the data used in section 10.2 are extracted from the World De-
velopment Indicators on CD-ROM 1998 by the World Bank (hereafter
WDI98), unless otherwise indicated.
Crisis index. The crisis index takes value 1 for a currency crisis and value
0 otherwise. A crisis is deﬁned as annual depreciation of the nominal ex-
change rate (with respect to the U.S. dollar) of at least 25 percent that is
also at least a 10 percent increase in the rate of depreciation.
Growth rate of per capita GDP. The per capita GDP growth rate is con-
structed by taking the log diﬀerence of per capita GDP.
Growth rate of real domestic credit. Real domestic credit denotes domestic
credit extended to the private sector by the banking sector divided by the
consumer price index (CPI). The banking sector comprises monetary au-
thorities, depository banks, and other ﬁnancial institutions (e.g., mutual
credit unions and housing ﬁnancial cooperatives).
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foreign exchange reserves are from the International Finance Statistics CD-
ROM March 1999 (hereafter IFS), and short-term foreign debt is obtained
by multiplying total foreign debt by the share of short-term foreign debt
in total foreign debt. Total foreign debt includes foreign borrowings by
the government sector, government-guaranteed foreign borrowings, non–
government-guaranteed private borrowings, and credit and short-term
debt provided by the International Monetary Fund.
Depreciation of the real exchange rate. The real exchange rate depreciation
is the log diﬀerence of the nominal exchange rate over CPI. The nominal
exchange rate is the year-end market exchange rate from IFS, whereas CPI
is from WDI98.
Changes in the terms of trade. Changes in the terms of trade are con-
structed by taking the log diﬀe r e n c eo ft h er a t i oo fe x p o r tp r i c et oi m p o r t
price. The export and import prices are export and import values (in cur-
rent U.S. dollars) divided by export and import volumes (in constant local
currency), respectively.
FDI/GDP. FDI denotes net foreign direct investment inﬂow.
Growth rate of foreign GDP. The foreign GDP growth rate is the log diﬀer-
ence of the total sum of GDPs of OECD economies.
Foreign interest rates. Foreign interest rates are the weighted average of
lending rates in the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, Germany,
and France. The weights are given by the currency composition of the
long-term debt in each country. The currency composition ratios are from
the World Bank (1997, 1998) and World Bank (various issues).
Regional contagion index. The regional contagion index is a weighted aver-
age of the crisis indexes of other countries. The weights are given by the
inverse of the geographical distance between the country in question and
other countries. For the geographical distance between two countries, lati-
tude and longitude of the corresponding capital cities are used.
Trade linkage index: The trade linkage index in section 10.2 is the same
as the one used by Glick and Rose (1998). The trade linkage between two







































370 Dongchul Cho and Kiseok Hongwhere Xik denotes aggregate bilateral exports from country i to k (k  i,0 )
and Xi denotes aggregate exports from country i.
Daily Data
Sovereign Spreads. The spread is deﬁned by subtracting the yield rate on
the U.S. Treasury bill from the yield rate on each sovereign bond in the
secondary market. We collected the yield rate of each country’s sovereign
bond from Bloomberg Online. The following are the CUSIP numbers of
the sovereign bonds, along with the speciﬁc name of the bond and due
date.
Argentina: 040114AN0, ARGENT 11, 10/06, USD, GOVT.
Brazil: 105756AG5, BRAZIL 9 3/8, 04/08, USD, GOVT.
Mexico: 593048bf7, MEX 8 5/8, 03/12/08, GOVT.
Malaysia: PETRONAS 7 1/8, 10/06, USD, PETRONAS.
China: 712219AE4, CHINA 7 3/4, 07/06, USD, GOVT.
Indonesia: 455780AB2, INDO 7 3/4, 08/06, USD, GOVT.
Thailand: 88322kac5, Thailand Kingdom, Thai, 3/4, 04/07.
Korea: Korea Development Bank due to 2003, 10 years, Global.
Japan: TOKYO MISTZUBISHI, BOT, 7 3/4, 11/02/02.
Russia: XS0077745163, RUSSIA 10, 06/07, USD, GOVT.
Treasury Bill: T 5 1/4, 02/15/29, 30 years.
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Comment Nouriel Roubini
This paper presents an empirical study of the causes of the Korean crisis
of 1997–98. The authors analyze whether the crisis was due to domestic
fundamentals or external interdependence (or contagion). They present a
variety of evidence, both econometric and more qualitative.
There has been a broad debate on whether the Korean crisis was due to
fundamentals or rather was caused by a liquidity run (with foreign banks
suddenly withdrawing interbank lines) exacerbated by international conta-
gion. In a sense, these alternative explanations are not contradictory but
rather complementary. Seriously weak fundamentals may have initially
triggered the crisis, but international contagion from East Asia to Korea
Nouriel Roubini is professor of economics at the Stern School of Business, New York
University, and a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
Currency Crisis of Korea 373(and vice versa) and a self-fulﬁlling bank-run psychology and panic may
have exacerbated it. So, the issue is more one of the relative weight of al-
ternative explanations. My reading of this paper and of the overall evi-
dence for Korea is that fundamentals certainly played an important role.
Although traditional fundamentals were not important in Korea (as public
deﬁcits and debt were low; inﬂation low; and savings and investment rates
high), other structural weaknesses related to the ﬁnancial system and dis-
torted investment and borrowing incentives were very important. To sum-
marize, the fundamental weaknesses of Korea, even before the onset of
the currency crisis at the end of 1997, were as follows:
1. A severe recession in early 1997, well before the currency crisis.
2. Severe corporate distress (with seven out of the top thirty chaebols
being eﬀectively bankrupt by the middle of 1997). The distress of the cor-
porations led to signiﬁcant distress for a wide range of ﬁnancial institu-
tions (merchant and commercial banks).
3. Large current account deﬁcits in 1996 driven by excessive investment
and severe terms of trade shock (the fall in semiconductor prices) and a
moderate amount of real appreciation of the currency.
4. Current account deﬁcits mostly ﬁnanced by short-term unhedged
foreign currency loans (mostly cross-border interbank loans).
5. Short-term debt to foreign reserves (an important early warning sig-
nal) was high at the onset of the crisis and inward FDI very low given
restrictions and regulations to FDI.
6. Dominance of the economy by “empire maximizing” chaebols that
were overinvesting and ineﬃcient.
7. Excessive investment was partly driven by “connected lending” and
“directed lending” policies. Moral hazard-inducing implicit and explicit
guarantees also distorted investment and borrowing and lending decisions
of chaebols and ﬁnancial institutions. Poor supervision and regulation of
the ﬁnancial system worsened such distortions.
8. High leverage of the chaebols with debt-to-equity ratios being on av-
erage over 300 percent even before the crisis, and devaluation further in-
creased the burden of foreign currency debt.
9. Low proﬁtability of investment with two-thirds of chaebols having
losses in 1996 and the return on capital being low in the 1990s.
The qualitative and quantitative evidence presented in the paper is con-
sistent with this assessment, suggesting an important role for fundamentals
in triggering the crisis. The authors ﬁnd some role for both contagion and
domestic fundamentals.
The econometric analysis of the role of fundamentals and contagion is
performed in sections 10.2 and 10.3. In section 10.2, using a standard
probit model with data from about 100 countries, the authors ﬁnd that
fundamental weaknesses played a role, although contagion channels were
374 Dongchul Cho and Kiseok Hongalso important (more geographic proximity than trade). A few comments
on these results: First, traditional probit models are unable to capture non-
traditional fundamentals because data on variables other than standard
macro ones are not easily available. As the previous discussion suggests,
the weaknesses of Korea were in its ﬁnancial system and corporate struc-
ture rather than just traditional macro weaknesses. However, such struc-
tural variables are hard to measure and are not usually included in empiri-
cal models of the likelihood of a currency crisis. This may explain why the
predictive power of the model is good but statistically not very large. Sec-
ond, because proxies for geographic proximity and trade are highly corre-
lated, it is not clear whether the stronger statistical signiﬁcance of “prox-
imity” relative to trade links is driven by such trade links. Third, it would
have been useful to derive some direct proxies of ﬁnancial contagion (such
as common creditor links) rather than rely on proximity as a proxy for
such contagion links. Fourth, the decomposition in table 10.3 of the contri-
bution of various variables to the crisis probability is qualitatively interest-
ing and sensible, but the quantitative contribution of signiﬁcant factors
(e.g., FDI, high debt to reserves, and terms of trade shocks) is modest.
Given the signiﬁcant contribution of the contagion variable, more could
be done to ﬁgure out what this variable really proxies for: Is it “rational”
contagion or “irrational” contagion?
Section 10.3 considers in more detail the contagion question by studying
daily data on exchange rates and sovereign spreads for a set of emerging
market economies. Interestingly, the authors relate these asset prices to
news on Korea’s economy and ﬁnancial markets. They ﬁnd that negative
news about ﬁnancial distress of chaebols and ﬁnancial institutions drives
such asset prices. The analysis is interesting and the results sensible. There
are a number of general limitations to this approach: The country sample
is small; there are missing macro variables in the regressions, given the use
of daily data; and other asset prices such as stock prices and domestic
interest rates could also have been analyzed.
Some remarks on the exchange rate results: First, the correlation be-
tween the value of the won and the yen may be spurious and driven by
movement of the U.S. dollar; i.e., statistical correlation may occur even
if the two exchange rates are statistically independent. One could use a
numeraire to deal with this issue. Second, high correlation may be due to
heteroscedasticity (high variance in turbulent times). Third, some correla-
tions are low (as for the Japan correlations), but splitting the sample into
subperiods (such as those in 1998 when the yen was weak and falling) may
provide better results. Fourth, the VAR results on the contagion from East
Asia to the Korean currency are interesting; conversely, one may argue
that the free fall of the won in the fall of 1997 led to another round of
contagious eﬀects from Korea to the rest of the region.
The results on sovereign spreads are somewhat surprising: Korea’s
Currency Crisis of Korea 375spreads seem to be more correlated with those of Latin America than
those of Asia. This may be due to some “cross-hedging” across markets.
Also, the robustness of this result in subsamples of turbulent periods may
have to be tested. Also, the results of the Granger causality tests showing
causality going from Korea to East Asia but not vice versa are a bit at
odds with the exchange rate results suggesting contagion from East Asia
to Korea.
The results on the eﬀects of news on asset prices are novel and interest-
ing; they conﬁrm the view that negative domestic news about chaebols and
ﬁnancial distress of commercial and merchant banks as well as govern-
ment bailout policies negatively aﬀected asset markets. Two issues here:
Although bailout news signals that there are serious distress problems,
they should reduce panic and runs as long as the bailout commitment is
credible. The results instead seem to suggest that bailout news is perceived
as negative by investors. Second, ﬁnding a signiﬁcant eﬀe c to fb a dn e w so n
asset prices does not rule out the possibility that such prices overreacted to
the news; it is one thing to ﬁnd that news matters, and another to infer
that such signiﬁcant relations between news and prices imply no over-
shooting of such prices to the news. In the absence of a fundamental model
of the quantitative eﬀect of such news, it is again hard to assess whether
Korean ﬁnancial markets and foreign investors overreacted to the negative
news that came out of the Korean economy at the end of 1997. Although
fundamentals played a strong role, as the paper convincingly argues, at the
end of 1997 some run psychology and panic may have been triggered by
such negative developments and may have led Korea to the brink of de-
fault. Only the negotiated agreement at the end of 1997 between Korea
and its international creditor banks to roll over short term cross-border
lines avoided this potentially disastrous outcome.
In conclusion, this is an interesting empirical study of the causes of the
Korean crisis; it conﬁrms the view that fundamentals mattered in trig-
gering the crisis but that external interdependence (contagion) also mat-
tered. The results appear to be convincing. Perhaps the authors could have
tried to probe a little more the alternative view that Korea’s crisis was
caused by a self-fulﬁlling bank run and panic.
Comment Ponciano S. Intal, Jr.
I would like to congratulate Dongchul Cho and Kiseok Hong for their
admirable eﬀort in analyzing the causes of the recent currency crisis in
Korea. I start my comments on a few technical points. Afterwards, I will
Ponciano S. Intal, Jr. is professor of economics at De La Salle University.
376 Dongchul Cho and Kiseok Hongfocus on the real sector to complement Cho and Hong’s “fundamentals”
story. Of course, Cho and Hong, being Koreans, know the real sector as-
pects much more than I do. My aim is primarily to nudge the authors
to consider somewhat more fully the real sector aspects in their paper.
Clearly, no single paper can ever do justice to such a complex phenomenon
as a currency or economic crisis. Nevertheless, I feel that the authors will
end up with a more insightful paper if they give more space in the paper
on the real sector aspects of the Korean crisis.
Some Technical Points
One technical point I would like to highlight is that the contagion index
in the Cho and Hong paper does not measure the usual meaning of conta-
gion as presented in Kaminsky and Reinhart (chap. 3, this volume). Given
that the data used is annual, thereby raising issues of simultaneity/endo-
geneity, the geography-based contagion index can proxy more neatly the
trade, ﬁnancial, and investment linkages among neighboring countries,
i.e., akin to an index of economic integration or economic interdepen-
dence. Viewed this way, Cho and Hong’s contagion index supports better
the authors’ view that the Korean crisis was primarily determined by Ko-
rea’s fundamentals but was substantially aggravated by the crisis in South-
east Asia. (There may be some quibbling here, in the sense that what could
have been an economic turbulence in Korea ended up being a full-blown
crisis because of the regional contagion eﬀect.)
The second point is that some of the results are counterintuitive. For
example, in the case of Thailand and Indonesia, the results indicate that
the probability of a currency crisis in Thailand and Indonesia was histori-
cally higher during the late 1980s and early 1990s than in 1997. In view of
the modest results, Cho and Hong might like to consider modifying the
speciﬁcation of the probit model. For example, like in Corsetti, Pesenti,
and Roubini (chap. 1, this volume), Tornell (chap. 2, this volume), and
Kaminsky and Reinhart (chap. 3, this volume), it may be that some vari-
ables need to pass some threshold levels or be conditional upon other rele-
vant variables before they signiﬁcantly contribute to the occurrence of a
crisis. Cho and Hong may also like to use the sharp increase in the “foreign
exchange market pressure” a ` la Girton and Roper instead of a sharp drop
in the exchange rate as the measure of currency crisis. The foreign ex-
change market pressure is a weighted sum of the exchange rate change and
the change in foreign exchange reserves similar to those in Corsetti, Pes-
enti, and Roubini and Tornell. This is the more analytically satisfactory
measure, especially in developing countries that do not have free and ﬂex-
ible foreign exchange markets. Finally, the authors may also include direct
measures of ﬁnancial sector vulnerability in the probit model, given the
prominence of Korea’s ﬁnancial sector in the unraveling of Korea’s crisis.
The last technical point is related to the Granger causality tests. Using
Currency Crisis of Korea 377daily data of log diﬀerences of exchange rates, the authors found minimal
pair-wise correlation between the won and the Southeast Asian currencies.
Moreover, the Korean won Granger-caused the Southeast Asian curren-
cies, which is somewhat surprising. Except for the possible sample size
requirement of a Granger causality test, it does not seem persuasive that
daily data need to be used especially in the light of the counterintuitive
results and the fact that the South Korean won and the Southeast Asian
currencies are not freely ﬂoating.
Some Real Sector Underpinnings
Cho and Hong show the importance of terms of trade changes and real
exchange rate changes as contributing factors to the occurrence of cur-
rency crises. The authors did not discuss them; nevertheless, the two fac-
tors appear to be important for the Korean crisis story because they bring
out some of the real economy underpinnings of the ﬁnancial sector fragil-
ity in Korea. Speciﬁcally, the decline in Korea’s corporate proﬁt rate to its
lowest level ever (Smith 1998) may have stemmed in large part from the
appreciation of the won vis-a `-vis the yen (resulting in the loss of price
competitiveness of Korea’s exports vis-a `-vis Japan’s exports in third mar-
kets), the sharp fall in the export prices of Korea’s semiconductor exports,
and the signiﬁcant slowdown in Korea’s exports.
The drop in export prices was partly of Korea’s doing because Korea
is a major player in the world’s semiconductor chips industry. The drop
in export prices resulted from the serious overcapacity in the industry
brought about by the slowdown in world demand on the one hand and,
to some extent, the investment binge of Korea’s chaebols on the other.
The increased commodity concentration of Korea’s exports, which led to
Korea’s greater vulnerability to terms of trade changes, may have stemmed
in part from the chaebols’ bias for economies of scale as the source
of international competitiveness (rather than manufacturing ﬂexibility in
niches followed by Taiwanese ﬁrms), the real appreciation of the won, and
the sharp rise in real wages in Korea.
It must be noted that the chaebols’ corporate strategy is fundamentally
a high-wire act. Focusing on economies of scale as a source of competitive
advantage means building large, capital-intensive plants, which in the case
of Korea’s chaebols were largely debt ﬁnanced. Highly leveraged with his-
torically low corporate proﬁt rates compared to a number of East Asian
countries, the chaebols need robust growth in exports and the Korean
economy as well as low wages in labor-eﬃciency terms in order to stay
aﬂoat. However, the sharp rise in the real wages in the 1990s and the sharp
slowdown in exports and economic growth in 1996 substantially raised the
probability of corporate failures and, given the debt-ﬁnanced nature of
Korean investments, also of bank failures.
The 1997–98 Korean economic crisis has a precedent in Korea: the 1980
378 Dongchul Cho and Kiseok Hongcrisis, which was caused as much by debt-ﬁnanced overinvestment in the
late 1970s as by an external shock (the world oil price hike). A major
diﬀerence between the 1980 crisis and the 1997–98 crisis, however, is the
sharplyhigherrateofKoreanbank-intermediated,variable-rate,andshort-
term external debt in the recent episode. Cho and Hong show the signiﬁ-
cance of short-term debt as a predictor of a currency crisis. Why there was
a sharp rise in short-term external debt in Korea is an interesting issue by
itself. What is worth noting here is that it has been the less regulated mer-
chant banks that triggered Korea’s recent ﬁnancial crisis, just as it was the
less regulated ﬁnance companies that did it for Thailand in 1997 and for
the Philippines in the early 1980s. Although this points to the issue of
prudential regulations, it may also indicate problems related to the pace
and pattern of the liberalization and deregulation of Korea’s ﬁnancial
market.
Finally, it may be noted that within two years after the 1980 crisis, the
Korean economy recovered as Korea reﬂated and as the triple lows (i.e.,
low won, low interest rate, and low world oil price) eventually led to surg-
ing exports. A low won (i.e., depreciation of the won and appreciation of
the yen relative to the dollar) and a recovery in world semiconductor chip
prices may lead to an export-led recovery of the Korean economy. Never-
theless, the success story of the 1980s may not be totally replicated in the
recent episode. The drastically changed industrial relations environment
in Korea and the increasing competition from Southeast Asia and China
may constrain the recovery and growth potentials of the Korean economy.
Thus, the basis for optimism for sustained recovery from the crisis would
have to come from something else. Speciﬁcally, just as the 1980 crisis led
to Korea’s trade policy reforms, the 1997–98 crisis provides the impetus
for Korea’s ﬁnancial sector and corporate restructuring and governance
reforms. This seems to be happening despite much diﬃculty, as indicated
by the Daewoo case.
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